THE TEACHING OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
Edward Mc Whinney
My first and very basic point must be the essential relativism of the
dominant legal ideas in any country at a particular time, and that every
country ends up, ultimately, in getting the type of international law that
it deserves. For there is, inevitably, a fairly close correlation or symbiosis
between the high-level international law doctrine of any country-the
legal folklore as authoritatively interpreted by its professional legal
honoratioresor priestly caste in the courts and executive offices and the
law schools-and the demands and expectations and needs of that country's foreign policy.
By this I do not mean that the legal honoratiores in any crude sense
will bend themselves to the dictates of national foreign policy and distort
or pervert their legal doctrinal positions accordingly, though Georges
Scelle has warned us of the more obvious dangers of a didoublement
fonctionnel when the jurist wears, at the same time, the two hats of
professor and governmental adviser. I mean simply that, granted the
existence of a plurality of substantive and methodological approaches to
international law, those legal approaches will tend to survive in Holmes'
famed "market-place of ideas" which tend to be relevant to and genuinely helpful in the solution of the major tension-issues of the day of the
particular society concerned. On the one hand, one is reminded of Dr.
Gregory Tunkin's well-administered rebuke to Soviet legal writers, in
language oddly reminiscent of the American legal realists (and of Professor McDougal) for their "[w]eakness and incompleteness in juridical
argumentation and a tendency to slip into the easier path of ready-made
political argumentation reinforced by quotations . . . [producing] an
isolation from actual reality, from the foreign policy of the U.S.S.R. as
it is practiced."'
By the same token, however, while the Austinian, Roman Law-style
virtues of clarity and certainty and precision, and also noninvolvement
or at least detachedness, which characterize British international law
teaching in its golden era from the late nineteenth century until the time
of World War Two, seem perfectly attuned to the needs of a great
Colonial Empire at the apogee of its political-military power, those same
qualities may not be so valuable or useful, in community, societal terms,
in Britain today. In the aftermath of decolonization and the liquidation
'[1962] Sovetskoe Gosudarsivoi Pravo, No. 5, at 3.
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of imperial grandeur, when Britain has to work and trade under competitively rather unfavorable conditions in order to survive, it may be
argued whether some more affirmative, avowedly instrumental and
problem-oriented approach to international law might not be better
attuned to contemporary British needs.
Of course, there is an "American" approach to international law, just
as there is, demonstrably, a "Soviet" approach, and a "LatinAmerican" approach, and a "Continental-European Civil Law" approach, though the differences can, of course, be very much exaggerated.
Even in an era of ideological pluralism, the congruence of basic interests,
and the resulting mutual give-and-take reciprocity, seem usually to be
greater, in concrete problem-situations, than the conflict or opposition-at least in the case of those countries, East and West, at the same
essential stage of economic and technological development.
When one examines any one of these distinctive national or regional
approaches to international law in depth, however, and in terms not only
of substantive legal values but also (perhaps more pervasively) in terms
of basic legal method, one begins to appreciate the innate complexity of
the legal tradition involved and the polypolarity of the different cultural
sources contained in that legal tradition.
I look at Myres McDougal and I see an approach that is hailed by
many as being in a distinctively, even uniquely, "American" tradition,
but which we know, with its origins in sociological and the pragmatistrealist teachings of America between the two World Wars, has very
strong borrowings from and debts to Continental Europe before the
First World War, with perhaps a little bit of Dewey added to it for extra
measure. But McDougal is also, of course, a product of the Oxford
school of real property law training; and I think those of you who notice
the seeming curious coexistence, at times, of pragmatism and natural
law in the McDougal thinking will find certainly the pragmatism explained, methodologically at least, by German and, more directly, by
American social science teachings. But the natural law, it seems to me,
in its McDougallian manifestation, is pure Oxford real property training, when you get into what McDougal calls the shaping and sharing of
values, in trying to balance the competing interests present in any
problem-situation. In pursuing his international law of human dignity
in this particular way, McDougal comes back, after all, to cases like
Frederick the Great and the Miller Arnold; and this was one of the
favorite real property law paradigms, as we know.
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To turn back to the British scene, I think we can say that Ken Simmonds, who is a product of the postwar period which has been, at the
same time, both a period of ideological division and also a period of ever
closer association on a supranational or regional basis, has, with his
interests in comparative law, a training that is very much in keeping with
the needs of the times in international law.
I remember the present Solicitor General of the United States, Erwin
Griswold, when he was Dean of the Harvard Law School, saying that
the key to the future in law was in federalism. This was fifteen or twenty
years ago when the cold war was still on, but he looked to larger and
larger regional associations. I think he was right in this. There may be
some historical aberrations of a temporary sort in terms of these longrange trends to transnationalism or supranationalism. Biafra may or
may not be able successfully to assert its own sovereignty and independence; East Pakistan may or may not be able to translate itself into
Bangla Desh; Quebec may or may not be able to acquire "associate
state" status with the rest of Canada, or even to separate off. But in the
end result one knows that if Quebec separates from Canada, it will
probably have to proceed to form a Customs Unit with the rest of
Canada and with the United States; and it will certainly, to be economically viable, have to continue to receive substantial financial investment
from English-speaking Canada and above all from the United States.
In a sense, this regional building, which emerged as an alternative to
the cold war divisions, is part of our times. I suppose, in terms of the
skills and trainings of the international lawyer today, it means, in practical terms, that he is going to have to read more than Foreign Affairs or
the Royal Institute's InternationalAffairs, excellent as both those publications are. The international lawyer today is going to have to be a
comparative lawyer, too, and this is one of the pieces of advice that
Myres McDougal always gave: learn the languages and get into comparative law! It is very vital advice. In the period when the cold war has
given way to detente, it is, in a way, the opening towards the solution of
the key issues that Falk was writing about, this "endangered world's"
key issues. Is it surprising, on the comparative approach to national and
international law, that one finds that a Russian lawyer has very much
the same view on control or prevention of radioactive fallout as an
American lawyer; because of course the fallout occurs on the grass, and
Russian cows, like American cows, eat grass that is contaminated by
fallout. The problem, on examination, turns out to be one common to
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both legal systems, paving the way, of course, to a common, agreed
solution such as contained in the Moscow Test Ban Treaty of 1963.2
So that in a way, also, the international lawyer for the next twentyfive years-which is the period you are preparing for-is going to have
to be problem-oriented, too. But, in being problem-oriented, he is going
necessarily to be a comparative lawyer, and necessarily also to be a
linguist. To be honest, if you do not have any languages, as an international lawyer, then you do not have the tools of the trade today. The
revolution effected in American legal science fifty years or more ago by
the successful introduction of the Brandeis Brief, paving the way to the
acceptance of social science materials as part of the legal process, is
paralleled in some ways by the new emphasis on skills in language. If
you don't speak any foreign languages yourself, you may perhaps be
able to employ people to translate intelligently for you; but you can
always take the trouble to learn the languages yourself. You might be
surprised at the extent of the development of language skills among
American law school graduates today-not merely the conventional,
Western European languages, but Japanese and Chinese and the like,
and that without the students concerned having any distinctive family
background in the languages selected for study.
Now, in terms of problem-orientation, I suppose there may be an
advantage in coming from a small country, an advantage which the
British can certainly claim in relation to the two or three superpowers
at least. One is a little bit removed from the exigent here-and-now of
solving the cold war or going to summit meetings. One can be rather
more detached about solutions of problems that are agony, and life-anddeath, to certain people. For example, "What is the principle of selfdetermination today?" and "How does that principle balance the principle of nonintervention?"
Well, we may try to answer this in a Quebec context or an East
Pakistani context or a Nigerian context. It is very painful when you have
students from both sides in such a contest, and you try to provide the
answers, and you come inevitably to what the sociological school taught
us: that the solution of any legal problem is a matter of trying to balance
conflicting interests, and in the end it may be the skills of compromise
in the choice of ways and means of realizing particular interests that
allow of a solution.
'Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space, and Under Water,
Aug. 5, 1963, [1963] 2 U.S.T. 1313, T.I.A.S. No. 5433, 480 U.N.T.S. 43.
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What I am saying about the ultimate teaching of the American sociological school (and I stress again that although it is associated basically
with the United States at the moment, it has roots in the German Social
Democrats and the French Social Democrats before World War One,
and flowered in the United States really only in the period after 1918)
is that any industrial society, and certainly any post-industrial society,
must start with a problem-orientation, and must end up with the skills
of compromise as the ultimate tools for resolution of the interestsconflict involved.
If you apply a problem-orientation, of course, a good deal of your
answers will turn ultimately on how you conceptualize the problem. You
really have to find out what the problem is. If I may turn to Dr. Brownlie, I have had the pleasure of reading and reviewing his books, and I
admire the excellence of his classical English legal scholarship. But what
I miss-if I may add this note to our transatlantic debate-is the hypothesis or unifying generalization at the end. Classical English legal
scholarship seems to go all the way up to formulation of an hypothesis,
and yet to stop short on the brink without ever propounding or verifying
an hypothesis; whereas, by comparison, some North American writers
may offer the hypothesis or generalization without having done the field
work, in depth, beforehand. Perhaps this is one of the distinctive emphases in the North American approach that you do stop to ask, "What
is the problem?" You do try and identify the conflicting values involved,
and you do seek to establish the instruments or means available for
achieving each particular set of values, and you do attempt some sort
of quantification of the social cost of the various alternatives. This
approach does not, of course, by itself provide a final, ready-made
choice: In the actual art of decision-making, the subjective elements
necessarily enter into play. But as Radbruch and others have pointed
out, if you go through all those preliminary and intermediate steps in a
properly empirically based way up to the final stage of decision, you may
at least be spared the perverse or stupid decision.
If I may take this point a little further, I felt in some ways, Dr.
Brownlie-perhaps because several of the people concerned have been
my students-that your categorization of the distinctively LatinAmerican approach to the law of the sea was perhaps a little simplistic,
and that is why I tried to tempt you on the Canadian matter. I spent a
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good deal of time on this problem when the most recent Canadian
governmental policies were publicly announced, and I indicated certain
disagreements with the choices actually taken: This was the Canadian
Government's proclamation in relation to the Arctic waters. One of the
difficulties was that I was not satisfied that the Canadian Government
was fully clear in its own mind as to what the problem was (perhaps
because of conflicts or disagreements between various departments
within the Government). Obviously, your authoritative response, as a
governmental decision-maker, is going to be different, depending upon
what the problem is. If the problem is that great big American oil
tankers are coming through the Arctic waters and that they are going
to run into icebergs and spew oil out, then I suppose you are going to
start inquiries as to what is the frequency of such operations, and what
sort of pressure may be put on the Americans to get them to take the
tankers elsewhere or else to build a pipeline instead. Anyway, if you go
this way, you have a simple, ready-made answer: The Institute de Droit
International, I thought, came up with a very modest and reasonable
solution, in this particular context.
If your problem, however, is really your own national interests in
fisheries, then you start lobbying a little with the Russians and others,
although you soon find out when you talk to the Russians that they have
it all set up as far as fisheries are concerned, because they are the heirs
of Peter the Great and a quite considerable body of special "Russian"
international law doctrine. (There is something to be said for having a
long history: If you have special historically based claims, as Bill Butler
here will tell you that the Soviet Union has in regard to the law of the
sea, you do not have to enter into any trade-off or quid pro quo with
other people.)
If, on the other hand, what you want is to propound your own national sovereignty over the Arctic, then again your choice of instruments,
your choice of methods, your choice of tools of the trade, is going to be
rather different.
Now, one of the difficulties I had with the Canadian Government's
approach, as I have said, was that I did not think they were too clear
on what the problem was; and there was confusion, therefore, as to the
proper means to be chosen for solution of the problem. Secondly, it
seemed to me that some of the means chosen were quite unrelated to
achievement of any one of the possible three main objectives, and were
based, indeed, on bad fact-finding in themselves. I did not think, for
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example, that the exclusion of the World Court jurisdiction in relation
to a particular aspect of the Canadian measures was historically sound
in terms of long-proclaimed Canadian preferences for extension of the
compulsory jurisdiction of the World Court. If we were going to make
a change in that long-proclaimed attitude and to eliminate the World
Court's jurisdiction, then I think we should have had some more public
debate on it beforehand. But the thing that worried me a little was what
I myself can only view as very bad fact-finding. My own impression, and
it was based on a certain degree of firsthand research, was that the
World Court would not have taken the essentially negative, unimaginative approach to control of pollution of the high seas and coastal waters
that the Canadian Government indicated that it expected from the
Court, and which the Canadian Government offered as its public defense
for its exclusion, in advance, of Court jurisdiction in the matter.
So here what I am really saying is that the international lawyer
today-and I think this is the emphasis we try to give our students in
North America-is going to be solving concrete problems. And so he is
going to be a legal tactician; he is going to try and identify values and
value presuppositions; he is going also to identify the alternative means
of implementing particular values; and he is ultimately going to attempt
some sort of quantification of values or social costing, as you do in
economics and in related areas. Though this may not be a completely
satisfying answer to anyone who has his own built-in set of a priori
values, since it does not give any absolutistic, foolproof guide to the
actual value-choice involved in any problem, one can perhaps add that,
approached in this scientifically based, rigorously empirical way, the
problem of ultimate value-choice may be rather less divisive, even in an
era of ideological conflict, than it seems from outside the specialized
arena of the international lawyer today.
Let me say, by way of conclusion, that my own personal approach to
international law has changed considerably since I began my teaching,
and that it will continue to change and, I believe, to grow in the future.
I expect when I am as old as Professor McDougal (which is not really
so old) that I will have an even more developed Weltanschauung than I
have now. I have a federal law background, a comparative law background, and, for the last four or five years, the science-technology background which is a sort of concrete, field application of the two disciplines
I have already been speaking of. But I feel I have had enough, for the
moment, of the science-technology field studies, and I am moving on
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now to other things in the realm of legal theory-comparative legal theory
of international law. I do not think an international lawyer ten years
from now is going to be teaching what we are teaching today; but I am
sure that what he is going to do will be a logical product of our work
today. I have no doubt that the emphasis then, in British as well as in
American law schools, will be in substantive legal terms on comparative,
eclectic, inter-systemic approaches to international and supranational
law and that, in methodological terms, this will mean a scientifically
empirical problem-orientation in place of the rather sterile ideological
disputes and conflicts over rival sets of a priori values of yesteryear.

